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vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah (
State Prison,
·
Defendant-Respondent. f
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I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's granting of
respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's writ of habeas corpus was held on July 23, 1971. The
court granted respondent's motion to dismiss.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affinnance of the lower court's
dismissal of the appellant's writ of habeas corpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as expressed by petitioner in his brief with the following additions and clarifications.
The charges of attempted rape and sodomy were
subsequently dismissed because the petitioner had demanded a speedy trial pursuant to the Utah implementing statute, and the time therein provided for had expired.
The trial court's findings of fact showed that the
petitioner's parole revocation was the subject of a prior
habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah (Case No. C 163-70). That
petition was denied by the district court, and after careful
review of the files and record, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY
AFFORDED JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THESE
SAME ISSUES AND IS NOW BARRED BY
RES JUDICATA.

'
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The problem of repetitious writs of habeas corpus
has already been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court.
The general doctrine that res judicata is to be applied t:o
habeas corpus proceedings was thoroughly explained in
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1964).
In that case, a petition was denied by the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County. The petitioner subsequently
filed the same petition with the Utah Supreme Court
which referred it to the Fourth District Court. The Fourth
District Court denied the writ and on appeal the Utah
Supreme Court held that the judgment denying the writ
in the Third District Court was res judicata in the latter
proceeding wherein the writ of habeas corpus was sought
on the same grounds. The court explained "that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable t:o habeas corpus proceedings is supported by Rule 65B (f) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure wherein a petitioner must allege, among
other things, that the legality of the imprisonment has
not been adjudged in a prior proceeding and also whether
another petition for the same relief has been denied by
another court. The obvious purpose of this rule is to discourage successive applications based upon the same
grounds and the courts need not entertain them." Id. at
414. Therefore, the court's holding establishes the basic
premise that res judicata is to be applied t:o habeas corpus proceedings in Utah.
The question of res judicata in Burleigh, supra, is
somewhat different, however, from the case at bar. There
the prior petition had been filed in another state court,
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and res judicata was applied as between state courts.
Although the question whether res judicata is to be used
by a State Supreme Court to bar a petition previously
heard by a federal court, has not been decided on in Utah,
other states have provided some guidelines.
In State v. Boles, 142 S. E. 2d 463 (1965), the petitioner had previously filed a petition in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, and was afforded a full and complete hearing. The
petition was denied and Boles then filed a new petition
raising identical issues with the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia. That court held:
"A decision of the United States District
Court, in a prior habeas corpus proceeding instituted by the petitioner, wherein the identical question was presented for consideration, is final and
conclusive in this proceeding by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata."
The Court felt that where the petitioner had been given
full judicial review on the identical issues, state review
was not required.
In the case at bar, the facts are similar to Boles. The
appellant filed a petition in the federal district court of
Utah alleging the same violations as are included in this
petition - denial of due process at his parole revocation
hearing. The federal district court denied the petition,
and on appeal the Tenth Circuit stated:
"Brimhall contends that the parole revocation
was based primarily on a state criminal charge
that was subsequently dismissed and he challenges
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the propriety of that procedure. These circumstances are similar to Murphy v. Turner, 426 F. 2d
422 (10th Cir. 1970) and controlled by it . . .
Nevertheless, a careful review of the files and record in this case convinces us that the judgment of
the district court was correct and should be affirmed."
The Tenth Circuit looked critically at the petitioner's
allegations, carefully reviewed the record, and found that
he had not been denied due process at the parole revocation hearing. Petitioner now comes before this Court
with previously litigated issues and as the court held in
Burleigh, "the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to
habeas corpus proceeding ... the obvious purpose of this
rule is to discourage successive applications based upon
the same grounds and the courts need not entertain
them." The petitioner's petition is therefore barred.
POINT II.
THE STATUS OF A PAROLEE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF A PROBATIONER,
AND DICTA IN BAINE V. BECKSTEAD
SHOULD NOT BE READ TO CAUSE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
AND THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS.
In Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-l(b) (1953), parole is
defined as:
"A conditional release; condition being that:
if the prisoner makes good, he will receive an ab-

solute discharge from the balance of the sentA3nce,
but if he does not, he will be returned to serve the
unexpired time."
The decision for parole is controlled entirely by an independent sfate agency, the Board of Pardons.
On the other hand, probation falls entirely within the
discretion of the trial court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17
(1953) provides:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the
public interest, the court having jurisdiction may
suspend the imposition or the execution of sen·
tence and may place the defendant on probation
for such period of time as the court shall deter·
mme.
"The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of the probation."
The trial court not only may decide whether probation will be granted, but it retains jurisdiction and if
the probationer violates any of the terms of his probation,
he reports to that court (Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-37
(1953)). In the case of a parolee, violations are reported
to the board of pardons (Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-38
(1953). A probationer is under judicial supervision; a
parolee conversely is under administrative supervision.
In the past, Utah has recognized the difference between parole and probation. In McCoy v. Harris, 108
Utah 407, 160 P. 2d 721 (1945), the court explained:
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"There are, however, some essential differences between the status of a parolee and a probationer ... The probationer is in that position
by virtue of a judgment of a competent court ...
Since a court judgment fixes certain legal rights
and responsibilities, they can only be modified or
abrogated by the judicial process of notice and
hearing." Id. at 723.
On the other hand, the parolee is no longer under
the court's jurisdiction:
"The additional liberty conferred by the parole

is a result of action by the board of pardons, an
administrative body. The parolee is still in cus-

todia legis and under the control of the state board,
though outside the prison walls . . . Rules and
regulations for the conduct of a paroled prisoner
are rules and regulations for control of prisoners .
. . . Violations of such rules is similar to violation
of rules within the prison, and constitute an abuse
of a privilege for which the privilege may be withdrawn." Id. at 723.
The court makes it clear that whereas a probationer is
to be afforded a judicial process for any change in status,
a parolee is entitled to an administrative review.
The petitioner cites Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4,
347 P. 2d 554 (1959), for the proposition that a parolee
must be given the same hearing as a probationer. Although the court felt that both should be "able to rely
on the representation that if he measures up to his responsibilities, he will not have his liberty taken from him
capriciously nor arbitrarily," the type of hearing granted
to each is different. The court's holding in this case should
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be limited to the facts. Baine was a probationer and the
court held tlwt as a probationer, he had the right to confront witnesses in the course of a judicial proceeding.
P:robat.ion as a judicial action takes place before the prisoner is placed under the direct control of the prison authorities, and therefore the hearing should include basic
judicial safeguards.
Parole, on the other hand, is revoked by the Board
of Pardons, which is not equipped to conduct judicial
hearings. The board has no power to issue subpoenas or
swear witnesses, and does not purport to conduct proceedings of a judicial nature. In Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.
2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970), the court pointed out that since
the board reviewed the prisoner's complete social, psychological, and psychiatric conditions and history, examined
a detailed report from the prison warden, and had available a report by the law enforcement officials responsible
for the legal proceedings, such "familiarity with a prisoner's case history removes a hearing on revocation from
the courtroom ambit and is the precise reason why traditional rules of evidence, including discovery, have no
place in these proceedings." Id. at 218. The Court further
explained that in such a hearing, "the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not generate rights
to confrontation, nor to cross-examination or compulsory
process." Id. at 219. In fact, the appellees in Alverez tried
to rely on Baine, and the court distinguished that case,
explaining "appellees erroneously maintain that the Utah
Supreme Court has equated the status of parolee with

that of a probationer, when the state courts restricted
its dictum on points to the right to a hearing ... which
is statutorily granted parolees retaken on the Board's
authority." Id. at 218.
The petitioner in the case at bar has also erroneously
reli2d on Baine v. Beckstead, but since the Utah Supreme
Court has previously discussed the difference between a
parolee and a probationer, and in order to avoid a needless conflict between the Tenth Circuit and Utah Supreme
Court standards of due process, Baine ought to be restricted to its facts.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PR 0 PERL Y DISMISSED THE PETITION SINCE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NOT REQUIRED
WHERE THE PETITION CAN BE DECIDED ON ITS FACE.
The trial court properly dismissed the appellant's
petition as provided in Rule 65B (i) (2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. This rule requires:
"If it is apparent to the court in which the
proceeding under this rule is instituted, that the
legality or constitutionality of his confinement has
already been adjudged in such prior proceedings,
the court shall forthwith dismiss such complaint,
. . . and no further proceedings shall be had on
such complaint."

10

In addition to Rule 65B (i) (2), the Utah Supreme
Court in Stinnett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 148, 434 P. 2d
753 (1967), explained that under Rule 65B (f) (3) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a hearing is not required
on a petition for habeas corpus where it appears from
the complaint that the petitioner is not entitled to any
relief.
This same issue was before the Court of Appeals of
Arizona in White v. Arizona, 442 P. 2d 869 (1968), and
there the court held:
"A hearing is not required if an applicant, as
a matter of law, is not entitled to relief . . . If
the record refutes the allegations of the petition,
summary denial is proper." Id. at 869.
When the appellant's petition was before the trial
court, the petition was closely reviewed and the authorities examined. Judge Sawaya found that when the parole
was revoked, the hearing conformed completely with the
tests set forth in Alverez, supra. The trial court correctly
interpreted the cases and held that as a matter of law,
the petitioner was not to be granted relief. Under such
circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to a full and
evidentiary hearing on his parole revocation.
POINT IV.
THE BOARD OF PARDONS IS EXPRESSLY
GRANTED THE AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE THE PAROLE AT ANY TIME IN UTAH
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CODE ANN. § 77-62-16 AND UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-62-17 (1953).
The Board of Pardons was established in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-62-2 (1953) and given the authority:
"To detennine by majority decision when and
under what conditions, ... persons now and hereafter serving sentences, ... may be released upon
parole ..." Utah Code Ann § 77-62-3 (1953).
"To adopt rules and regulations . . . for its
government, its meetings and hearings, the conduct of proceedings before it . . . and authorized
to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations ...
which shall establish the general conditions under
which parole shall be granted and revoked." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-62-7 ( 1953) .
In addition to the board's power to establish its own
rules and regulations, Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 and
77-62-17 (1953) authorizes the board "to terminate, at
any time, the parole of any offender" and upon the written certified order of its secretary, the offender can be
retaken and reprisoned.
In revoking a petitioner's parole, the Board of Pardons clearly acted within its statutory authority. Although a prisoner is released on parole, he still remains in
the legal custody of the Chief Adult Parole Office and is
subject to all conditions imposed by the Board. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-62-15 (1953). Petitioner violated the
conditions of his parole, and under its delegated authority, the Board had full power to revoke his parole. The
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Board afforded the petitioner a hearing as required in
Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 ( 1953) and after a determina.
tion of the facts, he was recommitted. There has been
no denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and since the Board followed the statutory guide.
lines, its action was valid.

CONCLUSION
The Court below committed no error and the judg·
ment and dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

